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NATURE OF THE CASE AND 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
This is an appeal of a criminal conviction, distribution of 
a controlled substance (marijuana), following a jury trial. The 
defendant/appellant was fined and placed on probation on the con-
dit1on that he serve thirty days in jail, a portion of which was 
stayed by this Honorable Court pending this appeal. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a of the verdict and judgment with 
a remand for a new trial with appropriate jury instruction. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The defendant was charged with selling an ounce of marijuana 
to Agent Spann of the State Drug and Liquor Enforcement Agency. 
The sole defense raised by the defendant was that he was entrapped 
into committing the offense. 
The inducement for the sale began a week or two before the 
day of the sale. Agent Spann and two other Drug and Liquor En-
forcement Agents became acquainted with the defendant's roommate, 
Mike P1ll1ng, at the Comic Book Lounge in Helper. Pilling invited 
tf,e agents to a keg party at his and the defendant's home follow-
1ng the close of the tavern. ( T-55.) 
The day of the party, Todd Evanoff had picked the defendant 
''P anrl taken him to breakfast because the defendant was depressed 
about being laid off from his employment. ( T-106.) Evanoff drank 
and played pool with the defendant until he had to leave for his 
shift at the mine. (T-106.) When Evanoff returned, after work, 
the defendant was still at the bar drinking and was so intoxicated 
that Evanoff felt he should take him home where they found the 
keg party in progress. (T. 107.) 
The agents testified that there were over thirty people at 
the party but they did not notice anyone smoking marijuana nor 
could they find anyone who could sell them any. (T-58,59.) 
Agent Spann closely resembled the defendant in appearance 
and was introduced to people at the party as the defendant's 
brother. (T-57.) They began acting as if they were old friends. 
(T-102.) Photographs of the defendant and Agent Spann embracing 
each other at the party were introduced into evidence. (Exhibit 
D-2.) 
The agents were claiming to be working as "tool runners" 
visiting the drilling rigs in the Roosevelt oil fields. (T-59.) 
Agent Spann admitted that the defendant asked him if he could get 
him a job (T-60), but denied that he offered to do so. (Id.) 
Mike Pilling testified that Agent Spann told the defendant 
that there were a lot of jobs over in the oil fields; that he knew 
a lot of people there; and that he could probably get the defen-
dant a job. (T-97.) The defendant testified that Agent Spann 
told him there was plenty of work in the oil fields; that he wou11 
keep an eye open for a position; and come back to Price and tell 
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h1m when he found one. (T-114.) It was in that context, accord-
1ng to the defendant, that he agreed, in return, to obtain some 
marijuana for· the agent. (T-114.) 
The defendant testified that Agent Spann came back the next 
morning but the defendant was too hung-over to do anything. 
(T-115.) The agent returned in four or five days and asked the 
defendant if he had found any marijuana but defendant had not. 
The agent told defendant that he was going to Roosevelt and would 
look for a job for the defendant (T-117) and asked the defendant 
to look for some marijuana for him which the defendant agreed to 
do. (T-115,117.) 
The defendant obtained some marijuana from a friend and a 
scale to weigh it because he did not know how much Spann wanted. 
(T-117.) When Agent Spann returned the day of the sale, the defen-
dant invited him and two other agents in to smoke some marijuana. 
The defendant asked Agent Spann how much he wanted and the agent 
replied, "One ounce." The defendant attempted to weigh out one 
ounce (28 grams) but was so inept at the use of the scales that he 
actually gave the agent 1.43 ounces (40 grams). ( T-52, 118, 144.) 
The defendant testified that he had never sold marijuana be-
fore. 
Over the defendant's objection and exception (T-142), the 
trial court, in defining "entrapment" added to the statutory 
language the following paragraph: 
In assessing police conduct under 
the defense of entrapment, the test 
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to determine an unlawf11l entrcipment 
is whether a law enforcement off1c1al 
or agent, in order to obtci1n evidence 
of the comm1ss1on of an offense, lnduced 
the defendant to comnnt such an offense 
by persuasion or inducement which would 
be effective to presuade [sic) an average 
person, other than one who was merely 
given the opportunity to commit the 
offense. (Instruction c.) 
The prosecutor relied heavily upon this part of the instruc-
tion in his closing and rebuttal arguments, arguing that there was 
no entrapment under even the defendant's version of the facts 
since an "average person" would not sell drugs because someone 
promised to help him find a job. The prosecutor asked the jurors 
as "average persons" whether they would sell drugs under such cir-
cumstances. (T-146,147.) 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING THE 
JURY BY SUBSTANTIALLY RAISING THE 
STANDARD FOR UNLAWFUL ENTRAPMENT ABOVE 
THAT DEFINED BY STATUTE AND THIS COURT. 
The affirmative defense of entrapment has been codified by 
the legislature as follows: 
§76-2-303. Entrapment--(1) It is a 
defense that the actor was entrapped into 
conirnitting the offense. Entrapment 
occurs when a law enforcement off1cer or 
person directed by or acting in co-operation 
with the officer induces the commission 
of an offense in order to obtain ev1dence 
of the commission for prosecution by methods 
creating a substantial risk "that the 
offense would be committed bv one not 
otherwise ready to commit lt. Conduct 
merely affording a person an opportunity 
to commit an offense doPs not constitute 
entrapment. 
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Th1s Court has approved giving the statutory definition of 
rntrapment to the iury, State v. Salmon, 612 P.2d 366, 369 (Utah 
197 ) . The defendant requested that the jury be so instructed in 
this case. However, the trial court, in addition to reciting the 
statutory definition added the following paragraph: 
In asessing the police conduct under 
the defense of entrapment, the test to 
determine an unlawful entrapment is 
whether a law enforcement official or an 
agent, in order to obtain evidence of the 
commission of an offense, induced the 
Defendant to commit such offense by 
persuasion or inducement which would be 
effective to presuade [sic] an average 
person, other than one who was merely 
given the opportunity to commit the 
offense. [Emphasis added.) 
This paragraph did not merely clarify the statutory defini-
tion--it modified the test in two particulars. 
First, the statutory definition merely requires a "substan-
tial risk" while the trial court's test requires that the conduct 
"would be effective" to induce the commission of the offense. 
Second, and more importantly, the trial court's definition 
requires that the conduct would induce an "average person" to com-
m1t the offense, while the statutory definition merely requires 
conduct that might induce "one not otherwise ready to commit it." 
Thus, under the statutory definition, it would be a defense if 
the police engaged in conduct which created a substantial risk 
U1at one who otherwise was not ready to commit the offense but did 
11ot possess the moral fiber and inhibitions of the average citizen 
,,,uu!d comm1t Jt; whereas, under the court's definition, it would 
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not be a defense if a jury believed the conduct would not have 
been "effective to induce the average person". 
It is difficult to imagine the type of inducement that 
be effective to induce the "average" Utah c1t1zen to engage in 
drug dealing. The "average" Utah citizen regards drug dealing 
as not only unlawful but highly immoral and drug dealers as repre-
hensible people--that is why they elect legislators who will be 
tough on drug dealers. There are, however, thousands of drug 
users who do not believe that drugs are that immoral and who re-
gard dealers as people who fulfill a need or demand. Such a per-
son might be reluctant to sell drugs because it is a felony, but 
would certainly be easier to persuade to do so than the "average" 
citizen. The legislature has decided, for policy reasons, to al-
low even weak, immoral persons to raise the defense if the induce-
ment raised a substantial risk that one otherwise not ready to 
commit the offense would commit it. 
In the hands of a competent prosecutor, the trial court's 
definition practically eliminates the defense of entrapment be-
cause the defense must persuade a jury of "average citizens" that 
the police conduct shown by the evidence would have been effective 
to induce them to deal drugs--not an easy thing to do. Carbon 
County juries have a reputation for disl1k1ng the methods of the 
State Liquor and Narcotics Enforcement Officers but they are cer 
tainly not going to say that drug dealing 1s something the aver.•g 
person can be induced to do. 
The trial court believed that this Court had mandated giving 
an "average person" instruction in State v. Salmon, 612 P.2d 366 
(Utah 197 ) < (T-144.) As noted earlier, State v. Salmon upheld 
a conviction where the statutory definition had been given to the 
iury, 612 P.2d at 369. The Salmon decision does, however, in the 
course of analysis, state: 
As stated in Taylor, the objective 
test does not prohibit the police from 
affording a person an opportunity 
to commit crime, it only prohibits 
active inducements on the part of the 
government for the purpose of luring 
an "average" person into the commission 
of an offense. 612 P.2d at 368. 
However, the author of that decision did not suggest that 
that sentence be taken out of context and delivered to a jury as 
the test. The "average person" language originated in State v. 
Taylor, 599 P.2d 496, 503 (197 ) and, unfortunately, was reduced 
to a headnote in Utah Code Annotated, §8b U.C.A. 3 (1982 Supp.). 
However, the clear dictum nature of the language is made evident 
by reading the case. In Taylor, this Court reversed a jury 
verdict and held that there was entrapment, as a matter of law, 
because the police used a former girlfriend who induced the defen-
dant to get heroin because she was going through withdrawal. 
Surely th1s Court was not saying that a Jury must find that such 
inducment would be effective to persuade the "average person" to 
sE"ll heroin. The "average person" might feel sorry for a drug 
'"id1ct and find treatment for him, but certainly would not go get 
l1ero1n and sell it to him even if the addict was a former lover. 
The one sentence headnote, taken alone, is 
conflict with the holding of the case. 
actually in direct 
The instant case illustrates the danger of taking a single 
sentence out of a complex analysis of a rather esoteric legal 
point and incorporating it into a jury instruction. The statutory 
definition clearly states the test and neither Salmon nor Taylor 
modified the statutory test. The Salmon decision approved giving 
the statutory definition, 612 P.2d at 369, and the Taylor decision 
clearly did not apply an abstract "average person" test yet alone 
mandate that a jury be given an instruction requiring the ap-
plication of such a test. 
The trial court believed the issue to be a choice between 
the "subjective" and "objective" tests and that this Court had 
adopted the objective test. (T-144.) It is doubtful that the fine 
distinctions drawn by appellate courts in the course of "sub-
jective" versus "objective" debates are particularly germane to 
the fact situation with which this jury was presented, and whether 
a jury would understand them in any event. The objective/sub-
jective distinction is important primarily where there is evidence 
of predisposition on the part of a defendant, such as prior 
criminal acts. The objective test precludes such evidence unless 
the defendant "opens it up" himself. 9.. , State v. Hansen, 588 
P.2d 164 (Utah Here the defendant put his character in 
issue with evidence of no prior sales. 
It is submitted that even the most ardent advocate of the 
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"objective test" would not instruct a jury with the language used 
in the instant case. One can apply the statutory test objectively 
by testing whether the police conduct might induce the commission 
of the offense by one not otherwise ready to commit it and who was 
not merely given an opportunity to commit the offense. The por-
tion of the trial court's instruction which the appellant objects 
to did not concern the manner in which the test was to be applied 
but stated what the test itself was. The statutory test, guarded 
against police conduct which would create criminals rather than 
discover them. Certainly, that half of the population which is 
below average is the most vulnerable to such conduct and should 
not be deprived of the defense. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that this Court correct the mis-
interpretation of the dicta from Taylor and Salmon and order a new 
trial for defendant with a jury instruction comporting with the 
statutory test for unlawful entrapment. 
DATED this 21st day of December, 1983. 
ttorney for Defendant/Appellant 
44 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-5835 
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CERTIFitATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this day of December, 1983, I 
delivered a true copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT to the 
attorney for the plaintiff/respondent herein, Attorney General, 
State of Utah, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114. 
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